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0. Abstract 
Mental disorders are currently defined in the official classification systems (DSM-5 and ICD-10) as 
syndromes consisting in clusters of symptoms combined with various exclusions conditions. 
However, these systems also assume that the symptoms occurs because of some underlying causes, 
which explain as why we regularly encounter in the population some specific clusters of symptoms 
rather than random distribution of symptoms. This paper aims at investigating the ontological status 
of mental disorders, reviewing the ontological commitments of various theoretical accounts defining 
mental disorders. It argues that, especially given the current state of the art in empirical research, 
mental disorders should be conceived as theoretical entities.  
 
1. The DSM-5 approach of mental disorders  
Introduced with the publication of the DSM-III, the symptom-based approach characterizing both the 
DSM-5 and the ICD-10 classifications systems constitutes the outcome of the legitimacy crisis of 
psychiatry within the third quarter of the XXth century. The third revision of the DSM aimed at 
responding to the strong criticisms and suspicions addressed to the post-world-war-II American 
psychiatry by endorsing a strictly atheoretical, purely descriptive and as objective as possible 
approach to mental illness (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005). Committing psychiatry to the scientific and 
deontological standards of evidence-based western medicine, it reaffirmed the status of psychiatry 
as a sub-discipline of medicine, giving rise to the medical model of psychiatry (Murphy, 2005). Its 
main features are that i) mental disorders are to be conceived along the case of medical diseases in 
general, because psychopathology “represents the manifestations of disturbed functions within a 
part of the body” (Guze 1992, 44). Research and therapeutic strategies with respect to mental illness 
requires ii) “the consistent application, in psychiatry, of modern medical thinking and methods” 
(Black 2005, 3). Furthermore, iii) the classification of mental disorders is value-free (see especially 
Boorse 1975, 1976, 1977, 1997), at least in some minimal sense (Wakefield, 1992). 
This approach, of which the DSM-5 is nothing but the direct continuation, defines mental disorders 
as clinically significant sets of co-occurring behavioral and psychological symptoms combined with 
exclusion conditions, which facilitate differential diagnosis. More precisely, a mental disorder is 
defined as “a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
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individual and that is typically associated with either a painful (distress) or impairment in one or 
more important areas of functioning (disability)” (APA, 1980, p. 6). This approach is said 
"atheoretical" or "descriptive" because it makes no assumption with respect to the causes of 
disorders. In particular, it is not the case that the causes of the symptoms defining a given disorder 
are a part of the individuation conditions of that disorder. This syndromal approach persisted in the 
fourth and fifth editions of the DSM, where a mental disorder is defined as “a syndrome 
characterized by a clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or 
behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes 
underlying mental functioning (APA, 2013, p. 20).   
This characterization reveals a deep ambiguity at the core of the medical model of psychiatry. Mental 
disorders are syndromes, i.e. as clusters of symptoms. It is assumed that these symptoms "reflects" a 
hypothetical internal dysfunction, which, whatever it is, is supposed to act as a common cause 
bringing about the observable symptoms. Such dysfunctions are thereby supposed to explain why we 
encounter stable clusters of symptoms in the population rather than a purely random distribution of 
symptoms: what holds symptoms together are dysfunctioning latent causes. However, the 
dysfunctions in question are not a part of the individuation conditions of mental disorders. This 
approach contrasts with the concept of a medical disease, which refers directly to impaired biological 
functions causing various symptoms. Here is a way of noticing the difference. In the case of general 
medical conditions, the relation between disease and symptom is contingent: one might have a 
disease without manifesting the symptoms, as for instance in incubation stages. This is precisely not 
the case within the DSM syndromal approach, which takes the relation between disorders and 
symptoms to be analytic, i.e. one cannot have a given disorder without manifesting the relevant 
symptoms with a minimal severity and vice-versa.  
The guiding question of this paper is to determine if, and if so, how, the medical model of psychiatry 
might be extended to match the requirements of the model of general medical diseases, which 
amounts to the question as to whether mental disorders can be defined on the basis of the symptom 
causes rather than on the basis of symptoms only. The dialectic of this paper shall be as follow. 
Providing an answer to these questions requires characterizing the dysfunctions causing the 
symptoms. After shortly summarizing the criticism addressed to the DSM syndromal approach 
(section 2), I shall assume as a working hypothesis that mental disorders are causes of symptoms 
rather than clusters of symptoms and review the main theoretical alternatives with regards to the 
ontological status of mental disorders (section 3). Indeed, dysfunctions require to be characterized 
against the background of a theory stating what normal functions are. Given the difficulties raised by 
each of these alternatives, I suggest in the positive part of this paper that mental disorders should be 
handled as theoretical entities and psychiatric diagnostic categories as theoretical terms (section 4). I 
shall finally clarify how such an account might handle the objection that is already addressed to the 
DSM syndromal approach, according to which it faces the risk of lumping together under the same 
diagnosis categories conditions that are notoriously heterogeneous from a neurobiological point of 
view (section 5 and 6).  
This paper shall not discuss the fundamentally normative question of who is and who is not mentally 
ill. As such, it does not aim at illumining questions as for instance why certain sets of behavioral traits 
count as sets of symptoms or why a specific degree of performance in the execution of a given 
cognitive function counts as dysfunction. It rather focuses on the ontological status of mental 
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disorders, highlighting the difficulties raised by the available options when on assume that mental 
disorders are latent causes of symptoms rather than symptoms clusters simpliciter.   
 
2. The DSM syndromal approach  
As already mentioned, the DSM-III, -IV, and -5 approaches of mental disorders focuses on symptoms 
in order to define mental disorders. Mental disorders essentially consist in clusters of symptoms. 
There is nothing more to the disorder than the symptom presentation, to the extent that a minimal 
threshold of distress or disturbance in the patient’s functioning is reached. Consider for instance 
Delusional disorders (table 1).  
Table 1 - Diagnostic criteria for 297.1 Delusional Disorder (APA, 2013, p. 90):  
Criterion 
A 
The presence of one (or more) delusions with a duration of 1 month or 
longer. 
Criterion 
B 
Criterion A for Schizophrenia has never been met. Note: if present, 
symptoms are not prominent and are related to the delusional theme (e.g., 
the sensation of being infested with insects associated with delusion of 
infestation).  
Criterion 
C 
Apart from the impact of the delusion(s) or its ramifications, functioning is 
not markedly impaired and behavior is not obviously bizarre or odd.  
Criterion 
D 
If manic or major depressive episodes have occurred, they have been brief 
relative to the duration of the delusional disorder.  
Criterion 
E 
The disturbance is not attributable to the physiological effects of a 
substance or another medical condition and is not better explained in terms 
of another mental disorder, such as body dysmorphic disorder or obsessive-
compulsive disorder.  
 
Accordingly, the presence of the one or more delusions over a period of at least one month (criterion 
A), combined with the satisfaction of some exclusion criteria (criteria B-E) is sufficient for the 
ascription of the diagnosis of Delusional disorder. Exclusion criteria B-D aim at delineating precise 
sets of symptoms by ruling out symptoms, of which the presence would modify the diagnosis. Hence, 
they do not impinge on the syndromal character of the approach. Criterion E is more ambiguous. The 
latter part is innocuous, since Body dysmorphic disorder and Obsessive-compulsive disorder are 
individuated as different clusters of symptoms. The former part makes reference to non-behavioral 
and non-mental parameters. This does however not contradict the symptom-based character of the 
approach, since the satisfaction of these conditions shifts the diagnosis towards a non-psychiatric 
diagnostic category. If the former condition in criterion E is satisfied, any psychiatric diagnosis is 
excluded, with the result that no mental disorder is defined by reference to non-symptomal criteria.  
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The DSM syndromal approach has been heavily criticized over the last decades. While the public and 
political discussions focused on the alleged arbitrary and over-inclusive character of diagnostic 
criteria, some theoretical concerns have also been raised, including, amongst others, the objective 
character of psychiatric classifications, the use of disjunctive taxa, the mental character of psychiatric 
conditions, etc. In order to keep our discussion as focused as possible, I shall focus on the syndromal 
character of the approach, which raises two main concerns. First, it seems to be a general 
desideratum of scientific activity and explanation to focus on causal explanations (Esfeld & Sachse, 
2011), amongst other reasons because, as nicely put forward by Woodward, causal relations are 
these relations that are exploitable for purpose of manipulation and control (Woodward, 2003). 
Obviously, defining mental disorders as clusters of symptoms does not, per se, prevents the 
development of various types of causal accounts with regards to the symptoms production, evolution 
or responses to treatment. However, it puts some distance between the theoretical foundations of 
psychiatry and the general medical model of diseases, where research mostly focuses not on the 
symptoms, but on their causes. Medical treatments typically target the disease itself, i.e. the causes 
of the symptoms, rather than the symptoms.  
Second, and most importantly for our purposes, the DSM approach faces the risk of lumping together 
medical conditions that are potentially extremely heterogeneous from a neurological perspective. 
The objection is rooted in the observation that biological systems display an important degree of 
variability at the individual level (Boyd, 1999; Wilson, Barker, & Bringandt, 2007). This implies that a 
given type of mental disorder might arise as the outcome of very different neurobiological 
pathomechanisms. In a nutshell, the fact that psychiatric categories focus on symptoms undermines 
empirical research because it fails to put the emphasis on the causal structure at work in the 
symptom production. Arguably, focusing on the causal structures leading to the symptoms paves the 
way to optimal explanations, course predictions and response to treatments. By contrast, if 
psychiatric categories focusing on symptoms lump together heterogeneous neurobiological 
conditions, then diagnoses based on these categories cannot distinguish between different forms of 
neurobiological dysfunctions, each of which is susceptible to have a specific course and its own 
response to treatment. Thereby, overlooking causal structures, the DSM syndomal approach directly 
undermines our ability to make accurate predictions.  
 
3. Scientific essentialism 
These elements motivate a stronger interpretation of the medical model of psychiatry, where, 
mental disorders essentially consist in the pathological dysfunctionning of the mechanisms that are 
causally responsible for the symptoms occurrence. Accordingly mental disorders are pathological 
dysfunctions of cognitive systems. Let us label this kind of position “strong essentialism” given its 
obvious connection with scientific essentialism (see for instance Bird, 2007; Ellis, 2001). Note that, in 
addition to the aforementioned elements, an appealing feature of strong essentialism is that it 
promises to confer to psychiatric diagnosis some degree of objectivity because it aims at defining 
mental disorders as abnormal alteration of specific psychological, cognitive, neurobiological 
functions, which are themselves defined against the background of well-established scientific 
theories.   
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The difficulties for strong essentialism start when one asks what the theory is, against the 
background of which the dysfunctions in question should be characterized. This question is 
important, since strong essentialism amounts to redefine mental disorders against the background of 
a specific scientific theory. Let us start with some theorists favoring strongly physicalist views here. 
The clearest example of such a strongly reductive framework is certainly Kandel’s New Intellectual 
Framework for Psychiatry (1998), where the correct level of scientific theorization in psychiatry is 
held to be genetic neurobiology. The reason is that gene expression constitutes the interface 
between properly genetic predispositions and environmental influences. Gene expression 
modifications are involved in many medical condition, but also in cognitive processes as long-lasting 
learning (LTP), and thus, crucially, in the development of psychiatric conditions. Emphasizing that 
psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy also impact on the patient’s condition by durably modifying 
patterns of synaptic connectivity, and thereby also modify the gene expression, the account suggests 
that mental illness should be characterized at this level of analysis. Kandel’s framework constitutes a 
perfect example of strong scientific essentialism: mental disorders are adequately characterized as 
abnormal neurobiological conditions, which might be due either to purely genetic factors or to the 
interaction of genetic predispositions and environmental factors. 
Kandel’s program might be interpreted either as an attempt to reduce the current classification to 
some neurobiological classification or as a way of eliminating the current classification to the benefit 
of a totally new classification based on neurbiological criteria. Each interpretation raises considerable 
difficulties. The first one requires nomologically necessary bi-conditional bridge-principles between 
our current disorder categories and categories constructed using the vocabulary of the reducing 
theory. As a result, strong essentialism implies that any individual who does not satisfy the target 
condition N in the reducing theory cannot be said to have mental disorder M, even though he or she 
manifests all the symptoms of M. The obvious worry is that the above mentioned important degree 
of variability observed in biological and biomedical sciences suggests that, at least for some mental 
disorders, several underlying neurobiological conditions exist. Indeed, just as mental properties are 
said to be multiply realizable, so are mental disorders: to the extent that mental disorders are 
individuated on the basis of symptoms, it is perfectly possible that neurobiologically different 
systems produce the same set of symptoms. This interpretation of Kandel's project is therefore 
heavily compromised.  
The second interpretation of Kandel’s program consists in discarding completely the current 
classification and redefining mental disorders entirely on the basis of neurobiological criteria, without 
any reference to behavioral and psychological symptoms or to the current classification. Some 
questions arise in this case as well. First, given that psychiatric categories are individuated on 
neurobiological grounds, patients have to be diagnosed based on neurobiological criteria only. 
Therefore, there is no scientific ground for grouping together patients on the basis of psychological 
and behavioral similarities. The psychological and behavioral commonalities that are at the root of 
the current classification system would be left with a purely heuristic role, guiding scientists within 
the process of selecting the sets of individuals on the basis of which neurobiological inquiries might 
be conducted. Besides, we clearly fly away from the way we usually identify mental illness.  
Second, strong essentialism aims at anchoring mental disorders within the causal structure 
responsible for the occurrence of the symptoms, in order to improve our ability to make course 
prediction and to develop therapeutic interventions. Given the underlying variability challenge to the 
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DSM approach, we might expect that such an approach will be developed into a system of 
classification that is finer-grained and where the extension of each category is smaller than in the 
actual system. Admittedly, there is certainly an explanatory and pragmatic interest at having the 
most detailed descriptions and predictions. Note however that we gain the ability to make better 
predictions that are specific to smaller sets of patients to the extent that we lose the ability to make 
coarser-grained predictions that apply to larger sets of patients. We face here a trade-off rather than 
a win-win situation: Arguably, discarding the current taxonomy to the benefice of a neurobiological 
taxonomy yields the risks of losing explanatorily interesting generalizations concerning patients 
presenting salient behavioral and psychological similarities.  
Finally, let us stress a pragmatic point. Re-defining mental illnesses in terms of neurobiological 
abnormalities is at best a very long term project and at worst impossible. Neurobiological psychiatry 
is by far not ready yet to take the highly multidisciplinary scientific aspects and the clinical practice of 
psychiatry over. A strict interpretation of Kandel's program requires the reformulation of our 
psychiatric knowledge in some neurobiological terms. The obstacle here consists in the fact that an 
important part of this knowledge concerns psychological and behavioral facts. To offer a simple 
example: it is unclear how to grasp in neurobiological terms the generalization formulated by Kendler 
and Precott (2006, p. 148), that stressful life events with humiliating features are highly 
depressogenic.  
Strong essentialism does not have to rely on neurobiology. The theory against the background of 
which the essence of the mental disorder might be characterized might be a higher-level theory, such 
as cognitive psychology. Heinrich (2001) and Andreasen (1997) argued that the correct framework in 
order to describe the dysfunctioning mechanisms in which psychiatry trades is cognitive 
neuroscience broadly construed. Indeed they draw a theoretical picture that fits very well the 
widespread idea of functional analysis (Cummins, 1975, 2000) or mechanistic explanations (Craver, 
2007). Their account constitutes a strong interpretation of the medical model in the sense that 
“contemporary psychiatry […] is the discipline within  cognitive  neuroscience  that  integrates  
information  from  all  these  related disciplines in order to develop models that explain the cognitive 
dysfunctions of psychiatric  patients  based  on  knowledge  of normal brain/mind function” 
(Andreasen, 1997, p. 1586).  
While there is certainly a significant interest in bringing psychiatry and contemporary cognitive 
neuroscience closer, it is first unclear if cognitive neuroscience currently is an established theory with 
a list of admitted principles that can ground the classification of mental disorders. The individuation 
of cognitive functions is highly indirect and still subject to important debates. Furthermore, the 
complex interaction between different cognitive functions unfolding from the alteration of one of 
them is poorly understood. In short, the relations between cognitive functions and complex patterns 
of symptoms are poorly understood.  
Besides, it is unclear from a theoretical perspective as to whether cognitive neuroscience constitutes 
a unified theory with unified explanatory principles, since it combines data acquired using very 
different methods and originating from different fields and levels of explanation. Furthermore, while 
Andreasen’s explanatory scheme seems close to what philosophers call functional analysis or 
reductive explanations, it is unclear what the detail of the adequacy conditions for these 
explanations are. With respect to these issues, Kendler, Zachar and Craver forward the proposal that 
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mental disorders consist  in clusters of impaired mechanistic properties, “which are themselves fuzzy 
sets deﬁned by mechanisms at multiple levels that act and interact to produce the key features [of 
the disorder kind]” (K. S. Kendler, Zachar, & Craver, 2011). This account relies on Craver’s mechanistic 
account of the unity of neuroscience (2007). Accordingly, cognitive neuroscience, including 
psychiatry when it comes to cognitive impairments, essentially aims at explaining higher-level 
phenomena by means of lower-level phenomena. The central idea is that a mechanism m for the 
phenomenon p is a collection of δ-organized components c1, … cm performing the activities φ1, …, φm 
such that m as a whole exhibits the causal role ψ of p (Craver, 2007, pp. 6-7). The unity of cognitive 
neuroscience is achieved by gathering explanatory resources in different sub-disciplines in order to 
show how a given cognitive phenomenon is integrated into a nested hierarchy of mechanisms both 
as a component of a mechanism explaining a higher-level phenomenon, and as a phenomenon that is 
itself explained by a lower-level mechanism (Craver, 2007, pp. 257-258).  
Heinrich's, Andeasen's and Kendler and collegues’ accounts share the central idea that contemporary 
psychiatry should be grounded within contemporary cognitive neuroscience, which is an intrinsically 
multi-level discipline explaining cognitive phenomena reductively by means of lower-level 
phenomena, realizers or mechanisms. While it is indisputable that contemporary psychiatry does 
actually refer to variables located at different levels, relating ontologically heterogeneous variables 
does not come without difficulties. To cut a long story short, the classical problem arising is the well-
known causal exclusion problem (Kim, 2005), which stresses the tension between the claims i) that 
higher-level entities can causally influence lower-level phenomena and ii) that the physical world is 
causally close and complete. In short, to the extent that the physical world is causally complete and 
closed, it is unclear how higher-level variables might explain anything, since every aspect of the 
behavior, including psychiatric behavioral symptoms, clearly has a physical complete and sufficient 
cause. Besides, Craver’s mechanistic account also faces important metaphysical difficulties, which are 
related to the fact that he relies on interventionism in order to account for inter-level relations 
(Baumgartner, 2009). The worry here is that interventionism requires the Causal Markov condition to 
be satisfied, whereas inter-level composition relations are typically non-causal determination 
relations, excluding thereby the satisfaction of the Causal Markov condition (Soom, 2012).  
Finally, one might favor a purely psychological version of strong essentialism, where the essence of 
mental disorders lays in some faulty psychological process. There are at least two immediate 
difficulties. First, common-sense psychology cannot play the central role here, since a mental illness 
precisely appears that stunning because it hurts one's common-sense interpretation of other agents’ 
behavior. The debate with respect to the doxastic status of delusions is revealing: delusions seem not 
to be belief-type mental properties, since they clearly violate the standard requirements for belief 
ascription (Bortolotti, 2010). While psychoanalysis might be a candidate, it is unclear if it covers the 
entire spectrum of what we considers as mental illnesses and whether if it does - or can - 
characterize these within a theoretical framework that fits contemporary scientific standards 
(Lacewing, forthcoming). Finally, the central problem of a version of scientific essentialism relying on 
some psychological theory is the same as the one affecting the DSM descriptive approach in the first 
place: focusing on abstract categories leads to neglecting the underlying causal structures, which 
might turn out to be very heterogeneous. The lumping charge is back on stage. Furthermore, it 
would also be problematic to account for how these higher-level purely mental disorders would bring 
about symptoms that are themselves behavioral and therefore physical: the causal exclusion 
problem kicks in again. 
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4. Mental disorders as functional theoretical entities  
The positive proposal of this paper is that mental disorders should be conceptualized as theoretical 
entities that are extrinsically individuated by their typical causal relations to symptoms. Accordingly, 
anything causing the relevant sets of co-occurring symptoms qualifies as an instance of a given 
mental disorder type. Mental disorders are then theoretical dispositions to cause specific sets of 
symptoms. Just as the current DSM-approach, this account individuates mental disorders on the 
basis of the symptoms they produce. It however enforces a stronger version of the medical model by 
discarding the syndromal character of the DSM approach, since mental disorders are causes of 
symptoms rather than symptoms clusters simpliciter. Let us label this proposal “dispositional 
essentialism”.  
Consider once again the case of Delusional disorder. DSM-5 diagnostic criteria mention positive 
symptoms and exclusion conditions. Within dispositional essentialism, criterion A should be 
interpreted as specifying that delusional disorders cause delusions. Criterion B reduces to the non-
production of other symptoms, which might be grasped functionally by specifying that delusional 
disorders do not cause delusions that are bizarre, hallucination, disorganized speech, grossly 
disorganized or catatonic behavior, affective flattening, alogia or avolitions. Criterion C specifies that 
no other behavioral specificity is present, and might thereby be set aside. Criterion D and E excludes 
the presence of other symptoms and/or causes and thereby rules out alternative diagnoses.  
A generic definition of theoretical terms might be provided by the standard method of ramsification. 
Definition F specifies that an individual y has disorder Φ if and only if i) y has the relevant sets of 
behavioral and psychological symptoms, ii) y does not satisfy the conditions for some other 
diagnoses and iii) the symptoms are caused by the disorder. Condition i) grasps the symptoms, 
usually described in the section A of DSM diagnostic criteria.  
(F) y has mental disorder Φ if and only if (∃x1)(∃x2)(∃x3) … (∃xj) [T(y has 
symptoms b1 ∧ b2 ∧… ∧ bm) ∧ (y does not have symptoms bn ∧ … ∧ bq) ∧ (y has 
not x2 ∧ x3 ∧ … ∧ xj) ∧ (x1 causes symptoms b1 ∧ b2 ∧… ∧ bm ) ∧ (y has x1)].  
Given the general character of the DSM approach, an analog definition might be constructed for any 
mental disorder. Therefore, the disorders represented by variables x2, …, xn might also be replaced by 
relevant sets of symptoms, with the result that any mental disorder might be represented as a 
disposition to cause a specific set of symptoms, without reference to further mental disorders. It is 
therefore in principle possible to build, for any disorder, a definition mentioning only symptoms that 
have to be either specifically present or absent, delineating thereby precise sets of symptoms. The 
generic definition F* grasps the core of dispositional essentialism, i.e. that mental disorders are 
dispositions possessed by patients to cause specific sets of symptoms.  
(F*) y has mental disorder Φ if and only if (∃x1) [T(y has symptoms b1 ∧ b2 ∧… ∧ 
bm) ∧ (y does not have symptoms bn ∧ … ∧ bq) ∧ (y has x1) ∧ (x1 causes 
symptoms b1 ∧ b2 ∧… ∧ bn )].  
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Let us emphasize the following elements. First, it is possible to integrate diachronic etiological causes 
of mental disorders to this approach. Such a functional definition might always be further specified 
by adding further constraints, as long as these constraints are causally interpretable. For instance, 
Kendler & Prescott argues as mentioned that “stressful life events” are among the chief causes of 
depression, especially if they involve humiliation experiences. If required, such elements might be 
incorporated into an extended functional specification by adding a further element specifying typical 
causes.  
Second, a dispositional approach of mental disorders constitutes a starting point towards the 
reductive investigation of the neurophysiological impairments underlying mental disorders. Unless 
one redefines mental disorder entirely in neurobiological terms, one needs to operationalize mental 
disorders in such a way that it provides validation conditions for subsequent reductive inquiries. 
Stepping aside from psychiatry for an instant, consider the very project of providing reductive 
accounts of cognitive functions like spatial memory, action planning, visual guidance, priming, etc. 
Most recent theoretical accounts share the idea that higher-level cognitive phenomena have to be 
functionally defined in the first place. Higher-level cognitive functions, or dysfunctions, are then 
explained by reference to a given underlying cognitive mechanism (Craver, 2007; Machamer, Darden, 
& Craver, 2000), realizer (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 42-51; Kim, 2005, pp. 108-120) or set of sub-functions 
(Cummins, 1975, 2000) just in case the functions to be explained and the underlying structures are 
shown to have identical causal roles. The present account aims at bringing psychiatric explanation 
along these models, by analyzing mental disorders has having a typical causal role, which might be 
reductively explained in a similar way by reference to lower-level pathomechanisms.  
What are then mental disorders? We started by raising the question of the nature of mental 
disorders and examining different essentialist approaches to mental illness, concluding that mental 
disorders categories should be individuated as theoretical terms. If psychiatric categories are 
individuated in such a way, what are then the referents of these terms? Theoretical terms have to be 
understood as reference fixing devices: for any entity, satisfying the conditions specified in the 
definition of a given theoretical term is sufficient for the entity to be a case of the category in 
question. This is the crucial advantage of dispositional essentialism over strong essentialism: while it 
characterizes mental disorders as causes of the symptoms, it does neither specify at which 
ontological level mental disorders are located, nor what their intrinsic identity at these levels is.  
Let us be more specific. Given the aforementioned difficulties concerning the causal efficacy of 
higher-level variables with respect to behavior production, we are inclined to assume that mental 
disorder terms refer to neurobiological abnormalities, of which the causal efficacy is non-
problematic. Provided that dispositional essentialism fixes the reference of theoretical terms 
extrinsically, i.e. by specifying a network of causal relations, it is fully compatible with the underlying 
variability encountered in psychiatry: one and the same type of mental disorder might be underlain 
by different types of neurobiological abnormalities. The crucial benefit is that it is possible to take the 
referents of psychiatric terms to be physical or neurobiological entities, bypassing thereby the 
difficulties faced by non-fundamental forms of strong essentialism, while remaining compatible with 
the fact that individuals having the same type of disorder might nonetheless differ from a 
neurobiological point of view.  
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However, the lumping charge addressed to the DSM-descriptive approach kicks once again in. 
Dispositional essentialism might well lump together conditions that are highly heterogeneous from a 
neurological perspective. Construed as dispositions to cause sets of symptoms, mental disorders are 
abstract theoretical entities and thereby dispositional essentialism ignores the underlying fine-
grained pathological structures, which in turn undermines our ability both to make course 
predictions and to develop optimal therapeutically interventions.  
 
5. Specifying psychiatric sub-types: a walkthrough 
The last sections of this paper provide a way out of this problem based on some recent 
developments in the philosophy of special sciences. The idea is here to introduce disorder sub-types 
that are specific to certain neurobiological types of dysfunctions and that thereby provide genuine 
causal information about the underlying causal structure involved in psychiatric conditions. At the 
same time, this proposal preserves the idea that mental disorders have to be individuated as 
dispositions to cause behavioral and psychological symptoms.  
To begin with, psychiatric sub-types already constitute an important component of the current 
classification of mental disorders. The diagnosis of Major depressive disorder, single episode, might 
for instance be further specified as “with mood-congruent psychotic features”, “with catatonia”, 
“with melancholic features”, etc (APA, 2013, p. 162). Focusing on the default, the melancholic and 
the psychotic sub-types of depression, Malhi et al. suggest “that [these] three structural depressive 
subtypes appear functionally underpinned by diﬀerential contributions of serotonergic, 
noradrenergic and dopaminergic neurotransmitters, so inﬂuencing phenotypic distinction (our 
structural model) and allowing an aetiological model to be derived with treatment speciﬁcity 
implications” (Malhi, Parker, & Greenwood, 2005, p. 94). Following the model by Parker (2000), they 
assume at the observational level that all sub-types involve a depressed mood, while melancholic 
features are superimposed in the second case and further psychotic features are present in the third 
case. They argue that at the neurophysiological level, “each class involves the perturbation of 
separate (albeit, at times overlapping) [underlying] components that may undergo progressive 
recruitment across the classes” (Malhi, et al., 2005, p. 95). The main results are i) that serotonergic 
dysfunctions account for the shared mood component across the three considered sub-types, ii) that 
the interaction between serotonergic and noradrenergic dysfunctions underlays melancholic forms 
of depression, and iii) that psychomotor disturbance and psychotic features of depression results 
from of a diminished cerebral dopamine regulation.  
With respect to the lumping charge addressed to the DSM approach and to dispositional 
essentialism, the question is as to whether or not some further underlying variability subsists 
between patients falling under the very same psychiatric sub-type. If it is not the case, then Malhi et 
al. account provides necessary and sufficient neurophysiological conditions that are systemically 
correlated with observational sub-types. Observational sub-types and neurophysiological types are 
therefore co-extensional. Three consequences follow. First, all predictions that can be done on the 
basis of the description of the underlying neurobiological pathomechanism might by projected onto 
the corresponding observationally defined sub-type, and vice-versa. Both kinds of types have thus 
the same predictive value. Second, techniques of therapeutic interventions based on the knowledge 
of the underlying causal structure might be applied on the basis of the patient’s observational 
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description. Third, since we assume as our working hypothesis that there is no further variability 
distinguishing patients falling under the same sub-type, dispositional essentialism cannot be charged 
of lumping together heterogeneous conditions. As a result, under the working hypothesis that no 
further underlying variability subsists, an important arguments against dispositional essentialism 
vanishes.  
Let us now turn to the second case, where some further underlying variability between patients 
falling under the same sub-type is observed. In this case, the underlying variability challenge stands. 
Our suggestion consists in a generalization of Malhi’s et al. observations with respect to depression: 
whenever different pathomechanisms appear to underlie the same higher-level observationally 
defined psychiatric type or sub-type, we should construct further refined observational sub-types, 
such that each one grasps from the psychological and behavioral perspective effects that are specific 
to each type of neurobiological pathomechanism. From that point of view, the capacity of 
dispositional essentialism to handle the underlying variability challenge boils down to the question as 
to whether or not there are different pathomechanisms that always produce, whatever the 
circumstances are, the same effects and that cannot be distinguished using the descriptive resources 
of the DSM symptom-based approach. 
Taking into account space limitations for this paper, let us offer some brief remarks suggesting that 
this is not the case. To begin with, contra the initial formulation of the multiple realization argument 
by Fodor (1974) and Putnam (1967), it is nowadays common grounds in the philosophy of cognitive 
science that there is limited empirical evidence supporting paradigmatic examples of radical multiple 
realization. In other words, we still lack of genuine cases in which neurobiological differences do not 
lead to functional difference at all (Polger, 2008; Shagrir, 1998; Shapiro, 2000; Soom, 2011 section 
5.3). Arguably, different mechanisms might produce the same effect to the extent that these effects 
are only coarsely described. However, whenever one relies on more fine grained descriptions of 
behavior, one can observe what is called “incidental effects” (Cummins, 2000) or “side effects” 
(Esfeld, Sachse, & Soom, 2012). The use of a finer grain of description reveals that different 
mechanisms produce slightly different effects in behavior (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999), for instance in 
reaction time, precision in task execution, etc.  
Second, it is precisely a part of cognitive neuroscience methodology and background assumptions 
that specific experimental protocols might be used in order to magnify behavioral consequences of 
neurobiological differences (or the converse) and to establish statistically significant double 
differentiations correlating the behavioral performance of different groups of individuals with their 
respective neurobiological specificities. The possibility of exploiting specific tasks and experimental 
designs in order to highlight a double correlation between behavioral and neurobiological 
specificities is a central assumption and de facto an important element of the methodology of 
cognitive science (Soom, Sachse, & Esfeld, 2010). Experimental design plays here a crucial role. Very 
specific environmental conditions are used in order to observe behavioral differences that would not 
appear in other, more usual, conditions.  
Third, there are even theoretical reasons to assume that neurobiological differences are 
systematically correlated with observable behavioral differences. However, given that we do not 
intend to defend the reducibility of mental disorders sub-types to their respective underlying 
pathomechanisms, the defense of the nomologically necessary character of this claim exceeds the 
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scope of the present paper. We refer the readers to Esfled & Sachse (2011), Shapiro (2000), and 
Soom (2011 chapt. 6) for further theoretical considerations grounding the argument that, as a matter 
of nomological necessity, neurological differences imply behavioral differences, to the extent that 
adequate environmental conditions are provided. The crucial idea here is that two different 
mechanisms might certainly cause similar effects or symptoms under some specific circumstance, but 
not under all nomologically possible circumstances.  
Let us reframe the bigger picture. Dispositional essentialism defines mental disorders as theoretical 
entities that might vary in term of compositions and thereby faces the charge of lumping together 
neurobiological pathological conditions that are possibly heterogeneous. However, provided that 
refined descriptive resources taking the environmental circumstances are available, a corresponding 
variability might be observed at the behavioral level with the result that a sub-type of disorder might 
be specified for each type of pathomechanism. Therefore, it is in principle possible to construct 
functional sub-types of mental disorders that are co-extensive with neurobiological types of 
pathomechanisms.  
The co-extensionality in question constitutes the crucial step in order to meet the underlying 
variability challenge. Sub-types of mental disorders do not face this objection, since they do not lump 
together heterogeneous conditions. Furthermore, i) they implicitly provide information about the 
actual underlying causal structures, ii) they enable exactly the same set of predictions as the 
neurobiological descriptions of the corresponding pathomechanisms and iii), given that they convey 
information about the causal properties of the underlying pathomechanisms, they ground informed 
therapeutical decisions. 
 
6. Abstract categories in psychiatry  
The lesson to be drawn from the theoretical possibility of individuating functional sub-types is that 
the symptom-based individuation of psychiatric categories does not inherently undermine the 
explanatory and predictive value of psychiatric categories: if the symptom description grain is 
refined, the extension of types is narrowed down and sub-types highlight refined psychiatric 
similarities that are shared by relatively small group of patients, with the result that refined 
predictions are available.  
Conversely, neglecting the additional details that are usable in order to build sub-types allows for 
retrieving DSM categories with larger extensions. Membership to such abstract categories allows for 
general predictions, because psychiatric taxa are, according to dispositional essentialism, causally 
defined. However, enlarging the extension of categories by lumping together heterogeneous 
phenomena has its own price, of which the measure is the fact that these categories provide highly 
statistical and thereby less specific, predictions. In a nutshell, they provide only coarse-grained 
predictions.  
Do we need such abstract and coarse-grained types? The desideratum of establishing maximally 
precise and specific predictions is certainly a central goal of science that is at work in contemporary 
psychiatry. This aim should however screen off the interest of grasping abstract causal similarities 
between systems that are slightly different. In a certain sense, any actual scientific discipline stands 
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on a continuum between physics on the one hand, which aims at formulating strict laws yielding 
maximally precise predications, and the so-called special sciences on the other hand, which establish 
weaker predictions for entities that are only imperfectly similar. These ones nonetheless share 
objective commonalities at the macroscopic level, namely the fact that they exhibit similar behavior 
under usual circumstances, which grounds their common classification.  
Psychiatry occupies an ambivalent position on this continuum. It aims at explaining abnormal mental 
phenomena as precisely and as accurately alongside the methodology of contemporary cognitive 
neurosciences. Obviously, this pushes psychiatry towards the redefinition of mental disorders in 
terms of abnormal underlying pathomechanisms, bringing thereby psychiatry towards the physics 
side of the continuum. At the same time, the underlying variability encountered in cognitive and life 
sciences should not screen off important clinically observed commonalities, on the basis of which we 
identify mental illnesses in the first place. It has to be emphasized that only an abstract classification 
can highlights similarities that are shared by relatively larger sets of patients and allows formulating 
general, albeit less precise, predictions. Crucially, there is no principled reason for why precision of 
prediction should always be preferred over extension size.  
Let us finally clarify that it is not our purpose here to formulate any general recommendation with 
regards to the appropriate degree of precision for in the individuation of mental disorders. This 
essentially depends on our scientific and therapeutic goals. In certain cases, one might desire having 
as much detail as possible. As argued, the purely scientific project of bringing psychiatry closer to 
cognitive science and of accounting for mental disorders in terms of underlying pathomechanisms 
certainly requires the finest degree of description available. At the same time, this might not be 
necessary in all cases. This is a matter of conceptual and scientific leeway that should be decided on a 
case-by-case basis by psychiatrists.  
 
7. Concluding remarks  
In a theorist’s dream, each DSM category would smoothly reduce to a single, necessary and sufficient 
underlying neurological condition, with the result that our classification of mental disorders might be 
firmly anchored in a unified neurobiological theory of normal and altered cognition. Unfortunately, 
there are good reasons to think that such a program cannot be achieved. In particular, the underlying 
variability encountered in life sciences prevents the establishment of the bi-conditional bridge-laws 
required for inter-theoretic reduction. The metaphysical puzzle addressed here consists in 
developing an account of mental disorders, which defines mental disorders as causes of symptoms 
without taking commitments with respect to their neurobiological or cognitive nature. 
We offered an analysis where mental disorders are theoretical entities individuated by the causal 
relations in which they stand to symptoms. Thereby, a strict interpretation of the medical model is 
vindicated, since mental disorders are causes of symptoms rather than mere collections of 
symptoms. At the same time, individuating mental disorders extrinsically avoids any commitment 
with respect to the ontological status and constitution of mental disorders. That way, it avoids 
specifying a unique neurobiological condition that corresponds to each mental disorder. The 
underlying variability observed in the biological sciences cannot here raise worries. At the same time, 
the possibility of constructing sub-types of mental disorders is the key to avoid the lumping charge 
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addressed to the DSM descriptive approach. The theoretical possibility of establishing bi-conditional 
links between the sub-elements of a symptom-based causal classification and a neurobiological 
characterization of disorders ensures that the constructed sub-types yield relevant information with 
respect to the corresponding neurobiological condition. It furthermore secures that the resulting 
taxonomy might be in principle safely connected with the ongoing research in cognitive 
neuroscience. Dispositional essentialism thereby preserves a symptom-based approach of mental 
disorders while securing a close connection to contemporary research in cognitive neuroscience.  
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